Law, disrupted｜法律访谈

John is joined by Todd Anten, partner in Quinn Emanuel’s New York office and co-chair of the firm’s Trademark, Copyright, and Trade Secret practices, and Owen F. Roberts, partner in Quinn Emanuel’s New York office. They discuss a sixteen-year copyright dispute involving two appeals to the Second Circuit that centered on the scope of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act’s safe harbor provision. The plaintiffs were major music publishers and recording companies that own the copyrights to some of the world’s most famous songs. The defendant, represented by a Quinn Emanuel team led by Todd and Owen, was Vimeo, a popular video hosting and video sharing platform. The plaintiffs alleged that Vimeo should be held liable for copyright infringement based on users who posted videos incorporating the plaintiffs’ music without permission. The core issue was whether Vimeo was protected by the DMCA’s safe harbor provisions, which shield platforms such as Vimeo from copyright liability for the acts of their users as long as they comply with certain requirements. Among those requirements are that: (1) the platform does not have “the right or ability to control” allegedly infringing activity; and (2) the platform removes user-posted videos upon receiving sufficient knowledge of infringement, for example, the receipt of a DMCA notice from the copyright holder, or “red flag” knowledge that a video is obviously infringing. The plaintiffs argued that Vimeo did not satisfy these requirements. First, they argued that Vimeo’s voluntary internal moderation practices, such as the removal of unwanted videos, demonstrated that Vimeo controlled users’ infringing activity. Second, although the plaintiffs never sent Vimeo a DMCA takedown notice, they argued that Vimeo staff’s awareness that certain videos contained famous songs was enough to raise an inference of Vimeo’s “red flag” knowledge, imposing a duty on Vimeo staff to remove such videos on sight. In its defense, Vimeo argued that voluntary removal of unwanted videos (for example, bullying, sexual content, or advertising) did not disqualify it from safe harbor eligibility because it is consistent with the sort of moderation that Congress encouraged in the statute. Vimeo further argued that an ordinary Vimeo employee could not reasonably know whether a video is “obviously” infringing on sight and that the plaintiffs were in fact seeking an end-run around the DMCA notice-and-takedown regime. The Second Circuit agreed with Vimeo. It first concluded in 2016 that mere awareness that a video contains a famous song is not enough to show that it is obviously infringing; it could be authorized or a fair use, which are fact-intensive determinations. As the Court noted, even judges and copyright scholars have difficulty assessing the boundaries of fair use. The Court emphasized that copyright holders were not without remedy—they could send DMCA takedown notices for expeditious removal, which is the deliberate bargain that Congress struck. In 2025, the Second Circuit further ruled that a platform does not forfeit safe harbor by voluntarily removing unwanted videos, as such activity does not rise to providing “substantial influence” in the creation of infringing videos, and such moderation is inherent in promoting the advancement of technology. These outcomes reinforce the importance of the DMCA’s statutory notice-and-takedown regime, and underscore that a copyright holder’s desire for a new system is an issue to bring to Congress, not to the courts.

John is joined by Robert M. (“Bobby”) Schwartz, partner in Quinn Emanuel’s Los Angeles office and co-chair of the firm’s Media & Entertainment Industry Practice, and Marie M. Hayrapetian, associate in Quinn Emanuel’s Los Angeles office. They discuss recent cases testing whether large language model AI outputs may give rise to defamation claims. In one recent Georgia case, a journalist asked ChatGPT about a lawsuit and received a response stating that a company executive was an embezzler, even though the lawsuit did not involve any such allegations and he was not an embezzler. In another case, Google was sued after its AI overview tool incorrectly stated that a business was being sued by the Minnesota state attorney general for deceptive practices, an allegation that allegedly caused up to $200 million in lost sales. Other examples involve sexualized deepfake images allegedly generated from ordinary photos, creating reputational and privacy harms. Defamation law assumes a human speaker who publishes a false factual statement with some degree of fault. AI systems complicate that framework. In the case of LLM outputs, it is unclear who the speaker is. Is it the platform, the data scientists behind the platform, the user who created the prompt, or the model itself? It is also difficult to fit AI output into doctrines requiring intent, knowledge, or reckless disregard, especially in public figure cases that require proof of actual malice. In the Georgia case, the defense won a motion for summary judgment. The court concluded that the output would not reasonably be understood as stating actual facts because the system provided warnings about limitations and potential errors. That reasoning may be vulnerable on appeal, but it shows one approach courts may adopt to reject these claims. Republication may also result in liability. If someone republishes defamatory AI output as fact, ordinary defamation principles could apply. An unresolved issue is whether the Section 230 safe harbor protects platforms when AI output is generated through interactions between user prompts and the model. Current defamation law might ultimately be a poor fit for AI-generated speech. Assessing liability for AI-generated speech may eventually require a different legal framework, such as product liability law.

John is joined by Rebecca Abel, Supervising Deputy Federal Public Defender, and Kyra Nickell, Deputy Federal Public Defender, both with the Los Angeles Federal Public Defender’s Office. They discuss the wave of criminal cases arising from protests in Los Angeles against immigration enforcement actions. Rebecca and Kyra offer their own insights and do not speak on behalf of the Los Angeles Federal Public Defender’s Office. The government has filed more than seventy criminal cases in Los Angeles against protesters, most alleging felony assault on a federal officer. The cases generally stem from confrontations during demonstrations near federal facilities, where protesters, journalists, or bystanders are accused of physical contact with officers. These cases have gone to trial or been dismissed at a much higher rate than usual for the federal criminal dockets. Remarkably, each of the first six trials handled by the Los Angeles Federal Public Defender’s Office has ended in an acquittal. One case involved a photographer who had been documenting a protest outside the Metropolitan Detention Center after photographing demonstrators at a nearby Home Depot. He was charged with felony assault on a federal officer based on allegations that he touched an officer with his camera and then pushed the officer with his hand. At trial, the government relied mainly on testimony from the complaining officer and a supervisor, along with limited, distant, or incomplete video footage. The defense located additional witnesses and video, including independent journalists and protesters who had recorded the event from closer angles. The complaining officer testified that he was trying to create space between himself and the photographer when the photographer struck him. However, the defense introduced video evidence that contradicted the complaining officer’s testimony. The video showed the officer moved rapidly toward the photographer, that any contact between the camera and the officer’s face was incidental, and that the photographer’s later hand movement came only after the officer slapped the camera and advanced toward him. The defense argued that the physical contact was in self-defense rather than an assault. The jury deliberated for about five hours and asked for a rereading of the defendant’s testimony that he had been frightened and confused, suggesting that they were focused on the self-defense claim. The acquittal underscored the weakness of the evidence in this case and the unusual pattern emerging in these protest prosecutions.

John is joined by Jonathan Graham, Executive Vice President and General Counsel and Secretary of Amgen, one of the world’s largest biotech companies and one of the pioneers of the industry. They discuss in-house legal leadership in major biotech companies and how science, intellectual property, and regulation shape strategy. Jonathan began his practice clerking for the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, then became a litigator for a large firm. Later, his career shifted in-house. He believes that litigation training develops useful skills, including rapid issue spotting across unfamiliar domains, crisp written and oral advocacy, and an ability to understand stakeholders’ incentives. The biotech industry is unusually purpose-driven because the output is medicine that can extend life and restore quality of life. That mission creates urgency across functions, as delays can mean patients wait longer for needed therapies. The sector is also highly regulated and fast-moving, which elevates the importance of legal teams that operate as strategic partners rather than as a “department of no.” Intellectual property is the economic lifeblood of biological drug development. Bringing a molecule to market often costs billions of dollars and requires years of lab work, clinical trials, and manufacturing scale-up. Without enforceable patents, competitors could free ride, undermining investment incentives. This reality drives frequent, high-stakes patent disputes that can be hard to settle because exclusivity is enormously valuable. Patent doctrines often lag behind technology, forcing courts to fit new technologies into older legal frameworks. Artificial intelligence is potentially a powerful tool for discovery and analysis of molecules, but not a substitute for wet-lab validation or human inventorship. Regulators still require clinical evidence before any medicine is approved and likely will for the foreseeable future. Biosimilars are currently a booming market with many parallels to generic drugs. A company may participate in the market as both innovator and biosimilar supplier by leveraging its research and manufacturing capabilities. Finally, government-driven drug pricing controls may slow innovation over time, even though scientific progress and therapeutic potential remain strong.